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The Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA) and
the Federal Government’s Shortcomings
Elyne M. Vaught
We have sent our young men and women to make enormous
sacrifices in Iraq, and spent vast resources abroad at a time of tight
budgets at home . . . [T]hrough this remarkable chapter in the
history of the United States and Iraq, we have met our
responsibility. Now, it’s time to turn the page.1

I. INTRODUCTION
On August 31, 2010, President Barack Obama officially declared an end
to combat missions in Iraq.2 To soldiers seeking to advance their civilian
careers, such as Army Reserve Brigadier General Michael Silva, news like
this must have been inviting. It meant the end to numerous deployments
overseas to fight in a war that seemed never-ending and the promise of
returning home to a career placed on hold one too many times. Instead,
General Silva was fired from his civilian job upon returning home after a


Elyne M. Vaught is a 2014 JD candidate at Seattle University School of Law, where he
currently serves as the 2013-14 Editor in Chief of the Seattle Journal for Social Justice.
Prior to law school, Elyne served in the United States Army as a military intelligence
analyst from 2002-06. He spent one year deployed to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi
Freedom (2004-05). Elyne earned his BA in Criminal Justice, and minors in Government,
Sociology, African-American Studies, and Communications from Eastern Washington
University in 2010. This article is dedicated to all of the past and present members of the
armed services.
1
Helene Cooper & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Declares an End to Combat Mission in
Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/01/world/01
military.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (last visited Nov. 20, 2012) (President Obama
addressing the nation from the Oval Office).
2
Id.
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year of commanding a brigade3 in Iraq.4 As a civilian, General Silva worked
as a contract employee for the Customs and Border Patrol.5 After he was
fired, General Silva filed a Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act claim (USERRA)—which protects returning
service members from wrongful termination—against Customs. USERRA
prohibits employment discrimination against a service member on the basis
of past or current military obligations.6 Employers cannot deny service
members any of the following: initial employment, reemployment, retention
in employment, promotion, or any other benefit that a service member is
entitled to based on past or current military obligations.7 USERRA provides
protection for members of the active and reserve components of the United
States armed forces when it comes to civilian job rights and benefits.8
Since USERRA was signed into law in 1994, it has helped returning
service members get promptly reemployed in the same position that they
would have been in had they never deployed for military service.9
Moreover, USERRA ensures that the service member maintains the same
seniority, status, pay, and other rights as if he or she never left.10 The Justice
Department, charged with enforcing the provisions of USERRA against
3

See generally Operational Unit Diagrams, U.S. ARMY OFFICIAL HOMEPAGE,
http://www.army.mil/info/organization/unitsandcommands/oud/ (last visited Dec. 5,
2013) (describing that a typical army brigade can consist of approximately 3,000 to 5,000
soldiers).
4
Steve Vogel, Returning Military Members Allege Job Discrimination—by Federal
Government, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-0219/world/35445701_1_service-members-federal-government-userra/2.
5
Id.
6
Other Workplace Standards: Reemployment and Nondiscrimination Rights for
Uniformed Services Members, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/compliance
/guide/userra.htm (last updated Sept. 2009).
7
Id.
8
DOL’s Fiscal Year 2011 USERRA Report to Congress, U. S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/vets/programs/userra/ (last visited May 1, 2013).
9
Id.
10
Id.
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state and local government employers and private employers, declined to
take action in General Silva’s claim without providing a reason for such
refusal; however, after further review, General Silva eventually won his
claim.11
Many soldiers may not be as fortunate as General Silva was in his fight
to regain his civilian career due to difficulties in navigating the contours of
USERRA and the employer’s lack of education on such issues. Service
members face an uphill battle in trying to prevail on a USERRA claim. The
burden is on them to prove that they were discharged because of their
military service and for no other reason.12 This onerous burden of proof
may deter many from filing formal USERRA complaints in the first place.
The United States federal government is undoubtedly the largest
employer of Reservist and National Guard members.13 Approximately
123,000 of the 850,000 individuals serving in this “part-time”14 capacity are
federal employees in the civilian sector.15 As of December 18, 2012, the

11

See Vogel, supra note 4, at 2.
Silva, who reached a confidential settlement with Customs, remains angry that
the Justice Department did not pursue the case. “They refused to give any kind
of explanation,” he said. “The whole burden is put on the serving soldier to
defend your case.” The former brigadier general’s experience is not unusual.
Some employees penalized for their military service describe being forced to
wend their way through a frustrating bureaucracy before they get recourse.
Sometimes, veterans and advocates say, they never get it.

Id.
12

See Goico v. Boeing Co., 347 F. Supp. 2d 955, 983 (D. Kan. 2004) (holding that an
employee making a USERRA discrimination claim bears the initial burden of showing by
preponderance of the evidence that the employee’s military service was a substantial or
motivating factor in adverse employment action).
13
Vogel, supra note 4, at 1.
14
See Types of Military Service FAQ, TODAY’S MILITARY (last visited Dec. 5, 2013),
http://www.todaysmilitary.com/frequently-asked-military-questions/types-of-militaryservice-faq (Part-time refers to a soldier who serves in the Reserves or National Guard
component of the Armed Services).
15
Vogel, supra note 4, at 1.
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total number of National Guard and Reserve service members activated to
active duty16 was 56,865. By the end of 2014, when the United States’
withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan is expected to be complete,17 an
influx of returning service members will seek reemployment back in the
civilian workforce without delay.18 More specifically, many of these
members will seek reemployment with the federal government. Thus, if the
legislative intent behind USERRA is to promote non-career service in the
military by eliminating or minimizing the disadvantages to civilian careers
and employment,19 USERRA must be effective in its application not only to

16
See US Military – Active Duty, ABOUT.COM (last visited Dec. 5, 2013),
http://usmilitary.about.com/cs/generalinfo/g/actdu.htm (“Active-duty” refers to soldiers
that operate on a full-time basis).
17
See, e.g., Deb Riechmann, Afghanistan Drawdown: 202 Bases Closed, NATO Says,
THE HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 26, 2012, 10:55 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/08/26/afghanistan-drawdown-bases-closed_n_1831164.html (discussing that NATO
has closed more than 200 bases in Afghanistan and transferred nearly 300 others to local
forces, a concrete step toward its 2014 target of handing over security responsibility).
18
News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Nat’l Guard (in Fed. Status) and Reserve Activated
as of Dec. 18, 2012, (Dec. 19, 2012), available at http://www.defense.gov/releases
/release.aspx?releaseid=15754. The total number currently on active duty from the Army
National Guard and Army Reserve is 40,732; Navy Reserve, 5,098; Air National Guard
and Air Force Reserve, 8,020; Marine Corps Reserve, 2,368; and the Coast Guard
Reserve, 647. This brings the total National Guard and Reserve personnel who have been
activated to 56,865. Id.
19
See 38 U.S.C. § 4301 (1994):

(a) The purposes of this chapter are
(1) to encourage noncareer service in the uniformed services by eliminating or
minimizing the disadvantages to civilian careers and employment which can
result from such service;
(2) to minimize the disruption to the lives of persons performing service in the
uniformed services as well as to their employers, their fellow employees, and
their communities, by providing for the prompt reemployment of such persons
upon their completion of such service; and
(3) to prohibit discrimination against persons because of their service in the
uniformed services.
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state and private companies, but also to the federal government—especially
since it is purported to be the “model employer.”20
Amendments made to USERRA appear to have been effective over the
years in bolstering enforcement against state and private employers;
however, federal employees seeking similar protections actually have fewer
rights than their state and private sector counterparts.21 In fact, the federal
government is the biggest offender of USERRA. According to the
Department of Labor (DOL), in 2011, more than 18 percent of the 1,548
complaints of violations of USERRA involved federal agencies.22 Although
the current administration has made decreasing veterans’ unemployment
rates a priority,23 advocates for veterans claim that the process of
challenging alleged USERRA violations by the federal government is
extremely difficult.24 Despite the existence of USERRA, employees are
(b) It is the sense of Congress that the Federal Government should be a model
employer in carrying out the provisions of this chapter.
Id.
20

Id.
See THE HR SPECIALIST: NEW YORK EMPLOYMENT LAW, Reports Shows Uncle Sam
is Biggest USERRA Violator, BUSINESS MANAGEMENT DAILY (May 2, 2012, 11:00 AM),
http://www.businessmanagementdaily.com/30493 (discussing that the federal
government is the largest single employer of military reservists, 14 percent of whom
work for Uncle Sam. During federal fiscal year 2010, the Department of Labor sought
legal action on 43 USERRA cases involving federally employed reservists. But the
Department of Justice only pursued three of them.).
22
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, USERRA FY 2011 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS13 (July
2012), available at http://www.dol.gov/vets/programs/userra/2011USERRAReport.pdf
[hereinafter USERRA Report].
23
See Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on Ensuring
the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Act (USERRA) Protections
(July 19, 2012) [hereinafter Presidential Memo] (discussing efforts directed at the various
federal agencies to take steps to enhance recruitment of and promote employment
opportunities for veterans).
24
Employment Law Group, Federal Government is Top Violator of USERRA, Making it
Difficult for Veterans to Obtain and Keep Jobs, USERRA RIGHTS BLOG (Feb. 3, 2012,
3:39 PM) [hereinafter Top Violator], http://www.userrarightsblog.com/c/news/3036federal-government-is-top-violator-of-userra-making-it-difficult-for-veterans-to-obtain21
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being penalized for unfair reasons. Specifically, complaints against federal
government employers range from situations where employees were
penalized for being absent from their jobs when they were on active duty to
federal agencies that simply refused to rehire returning reservist and guard
members.25 Thus, the real issue that needs to be addressed is the federal
government’s lack of compliance with USERRA.26
Accordingly, the focus of this article will be on how USERRA fails to
address the real issue at hand: the federal government’s increased
noncompliance. First, this article will discuss the background of USERRA.
It will provide an overview of USERRA’s purpose coupled with a
discussion of whom and what is covered under the Act. Moreover, this
section will look at redressability under USERRA and what that means for
state and private employers as well as federal government employers.
Second, the article will address the possible defenses that are available to
employers to combat USERRA allegations. Finally, the article will examine
other state jurisdictions and their respective approaches to USERRA claims.
The primary focus here is to consider what other states are doing more
efficiently and recommend the implementation of some of their principles
into the federal plan to encourage compliance. Within this section, I will
discuss proposals that I believe are needed to effectively address the federal
government’s shortcomings when it comes to complying with USERRA.
This article serves to suggest a number of proposals that may help
compel the federal government to comply with the provisions of USERRA.
By no means does this article offer a complete remedy to the issue at hand.
It only offers suggestions that would help move the federal government
towards compliance. First, there needs to be an economic incentive for the
and-keep-jobs.html (claiming “that no government agency has oversight over resolving
USERRA claims”).
25
HR SPECIALIST, supra note 21.
26
See id.
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federal government to comply with USERRA. As it stands now, federal
employers that violate USERRA are only liable for back pay, whereas
private and state employers may be liable for liquidated damages in addition
to back pay and lost benefits (double the amount).27 Moreover, the
independent agency charged with informally adjudicating federal USERRA
claims holds sole discretion in determining whether attorney’s fees and
other litigation costs should be ordered for the service member.28 I will be
arguing that there should be a mandate requiring the award of attorney’s
fees and litigation costs along with back pay. In other words, I am arguing
for “double the damages.” Thus, there needs to be an emphasis on economic
penalties for federal employers’ noncompliance with USERRA. A tighter
economic grip will help incentivize compliance. Second, I will be arguing
for the implementation of a provision in USERRA making it a criminal
offense to discriminate against a service member on the basis of military
obligations. Currently, only civil penalties exist for violating USERRA. An
examination of two states that handle USERRA-like claims as a criminal
offense—Missouri and Washington—will be discussed to see what could be
done to implement similar approaches directed at federal government
compliance. Finally, in order to improve USERRA’s enforcement in the
federal government sector, employee-employer contracts that bind
employees into mandatory arbitration for USERRA disputes should be
deemed unenforceable.29 Allowing employers to hold service members to
27
28

Vogel, supra note 4, at 1.
38 U.S.C. § 4324(c)(4) (1994):
If the Board determines as a result of a hearing or adjudication conducted
pursuant to a complaint submitted by a person directly to the Board pursuant to
subsection (b) that such person is entitled to an order referred to in paragraph
(2), the Board may, in its discretion, award such person reasonable attorney
fees, expert witness fees, and other litigation expenses.

Id. (emphasis added).
See MATHEW R. TULLY, PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE USERRA 5 (2011).

29
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mandatory arbitration would turn USERRA on its face by taking any
discrimination claims based on military obligations out of the control of
USERRA. Essentially, the service member is stripped of all protections
under USERRA upon signing on the dotted line of an employment
agreement.

II. BACKGROUND OF THE UNIFORMED SERVICES EMPLOYMENT AND
REEMPLOYMENT ACT (USERRA) OF 1994
The Administration strongly believes that every man or woman
who has served in our country’s uniformed services deserves the
full protection of our employment laws, including USERRA. No
discrimination or unfair treatment based on one’s service will be
tolerated. We must do our utmost to ensure that all service
members’ employment and reemployment rights are respected.30
Reservists and Guard members have played an important role in the
United States since the days of the American Revolution. Initially, “citizensoldiers”31 owed their allegiance only to their respective states as members
of the various state militias.32 Today, the modern militia is the National
Guard.33 There are now seven distinct federal military reserve forces: Army
National Guard, Army Reserve, Naval Reserve, Air National Guard, Air
Force Reserve, Marine Corp Reserve, and Coast Guard Reserve.34 Many
citizens volunteer to participate in these forces, as evidenced by the latest

30

Presidential Memo, supra note 23.
See, e.g., Gregg Zoroya, Army to Expand Citizen Soldiers’ Training Periods, USA
TODAY, July 30, 2012, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/military/story/2012-0730/army-guard-reserve-training/56595948/1 (describing “citizen-soldiers” as just another
term for Reserve and National Guard soldiers).
32
Id.
33
See generally Frederick B. Wiener, The Militia Clause of the Constitution, 54 HARV.
L. REV. 181 (1940).
34
See NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, NATIONAL RESERVE FORCES
STATUS 1 (2004), available at http://www.nato.int/nrfc/database/usa.pdf (describing the
basic organization principles by military branch.).
31
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Defense Authorization Act allowing for a total of 852,733 Reservist as of
September 30, 2013.35 The number of service members on active duty in
2010 was just above 1.4 million.36 Thus, it is safe to say that a large
majority of service members returning over the months to come will be a
part of these Reserve/National Guard forces.
Many of the nation’s reservists and guard members face ongoing
employment problems. In addition to a sluggish economy, service members
are returning to both public and private sector employers who are hesitant to
retrain, promote, or reemploy them, in part because of fear that these
individuals will be called up again.37 As of 2012, the unemployment rate of
Americans who have served in the military at any time since September
2001 declined by 2.2 percentage points from 12.1 percent (2011) to 9.9

35

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, H.R. 4310, 112th Cong.
(2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr4310enr/pdf/BILLS112hr4310enr.pdf.
36
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MILITARY PERSONNEL ON ACTIVE DUTY BY RANK OR
GRADE: 1990 TO 2010 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/
2012/tables/12s0511.pdf.
37
See Tammy Binford, Veterans Soldiering Through Tough Job Market, HRHERO BLOG
(May 20, 2012), http://blogs.hrhero.com/diversity/2012/05/20/veterans-soldiering-onthrough-tough-job-market/.
Ted Daywalt, CEO and president of VetJobs, a company that connects
employers with veterans through a job-placement website, appeared before a
panel of the House Committee on Veterans Affairs in February. He pointed to
a 2007 Department of Defense policy on call-ups of the National Guard as a
reason many recent veterans have trouble finding employment. The policy
means Guard members finishing a long deployment face the potential of
another long deployment soon after returning to the workforce. Daywalt told
the panel that employers are hesitant to hire Guard members because of the
policy.
Id.
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percent (2012).38 Despite this slight decline, returning service members
seeking to advance their civilian careers are still affected by unemployment.
Under USERRA, employers are required by law to rehire returning
service members.39 The law prohibits discrimination based on military
service, preserves workers’ seniority and other benefits, and requires
employers to make reasonable efforts to accommodate disabled veterans.40
In 2008, the United States Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), which
adjudicates claims of federal employers’ violations of USERRA, received
533 cases from veterans accusing the federal government of violating their
rights.41 In 2010, that figure nearly doubled to 1,012 cases.42 The MSPB

38
Economic News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor . Statistics,
Employment
Situation
of
Veteran’s
Summary
(2012),
available
at
www.bls.gov/news.release/vet.nr0.htm.
39
Id. at § 4301(a)(2) (“[T]o minimize the disruption to the lives of persons performing
service in the uniformed services as well as to their employers, their fellow employees,
and their communities, by providing for the prompt reemployment of such persons upon
their completion of such service”).
40
See § 4311(a).

A person who is a member of, applies to be a member of, performs, has
performed, applies to perform, or has an obligation to perform service in a
uniformed service shall not be denied initial employment, reemployment,
retention in employment, promotion, or any benefit of employment by an
employer on the basis of that membership, application for membership,
performance of service, application for service, or obligation.
Id.
41

U.S. MERIT SYS. PROTEC. BD., U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD FISCAL
YEAR 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2010) [hereinafter MSPB 2009 ANNUAL REPORT],
available at http://www.mspb.gov/netsearch/viewdocs.aspx?docnumber=546704
&version=548287&application=ACROBAT.
42
U.S. MERIT SYS. PROTEC. BD., U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD FISCAL
YEAR 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 13 (2011) [hereinafter MSPB 2010 ANNUAL REPORT],
available at http://www.mspb.gov/netsearch/viewdocs.aspx?docnumber=576602&
version=578315&application=ACROBAT.
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issued over 8,200 decisions in the fiscal year 2011, about four percent more
than the 7,863 decisions issued in fiscal year 2010.43
Such a dramatic increase in the number of violations on the part of
federal government employers has compelled senior White House staff to
respond. In late 2012, the White House’s personnel chief, John Berry, called
on senior federal executives to ensure that Guard and Reserve troops
returning to their federal jobs were not penalized for their military service.
In a memo sent to President Obama’s Management Council and the Chief
Human Capital Officers Council, Berry affirmatively stated, “This
Administration has zero tolerance for violations of the Uniformed Services
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act.”44 The moment these remarks
were made, Berry cited encouraging news that the recent Bureau of Labor
Statistics figures showed a drop in veterans’ unemployment rates—from
12.1 percent in 2011 to 7.6 percent in 2012.45 However, another group
released a survey that same week indicating that the unemployment
numbers among returning Iraq and Afghanistan veterans stood at 16.7
percent.46
A. Purpose of USERRA
The legislative intent behind USERRA is to encourage non-career service
in the uniformed services by eliminating or minimizing the disadvantages to
civilian careers and employment that can result from such service.47
43

U.S. MERIT SYS. PROTEC. BD., U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD FISCAL
YEAR 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2013) [hereinafter MSPB 2012 ANNUAL REPORT],
available at http://www.mspb.gov/netsearch/viewdocs.aspx?docnumber=792967&
version=795988&application=ACROBAT.
44
Steve Vogel, Berry Calls for ‘Zero Tolerance’ for Federal USERRA Violations,
WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federaleye/post/berry-calls-for-zero-tolerance-for-federal-userra violations/2012/03/28/gIQAy0
PEhS_blog.html (statements from the White House’s personnel chief).
45
Id.
46
Id. (study conducted by a group called “Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America”).
47
38 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(1) (1994).
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USERRA is intended to establish a “floor, not a ceiling, for employment
and reemployment rights and benefits” of covered employees.48 Therefore,
federal or state laws, private contracts, or agreements that provides a greater
right or benefit than USERRA will not be affected.49 Thus, the primary goal
that USERRA seeks to reach is to minimize disruption to the following:
service members performing military obligations; employers; fellow
employees; and communities by providing for prompt reemployment upon
completion of service.50 The statutory language explicitly states that it is
the intent of Congress that the federal government should be held to the
standard of a model employer in carrying out the provisions of USERRA.51
An “employee” eligible for USERRA protection is defined simply as
“any person employed by an employer,” which includes a citizen, national,
or permanent resident alien of the United States who works in a foreign
country for an employer that is incorporated or otherwise organized in the
United States.52 Federal regulations further define employee to include

48

See § 4302(b) (1994).
This chapter supersedes any State law (including any local law or ordinance),
contract, agreement, policy, plan, practice, or other matter that reduces, limits,
or eliminates in any manner any right or benefit provided by this chapter,
including the establishment of additional prerequisites to the exercise of any
such right or the receipt of any such benefit.

Id. (emphasis added).
49
See § 4302(a) (1994).
Nothing in this chapter shall supersede, nullify or diminish any Federal or
State law (including any local law or ordinance), contract, agreement, policy,
plan, practice, or other matter that establishes a right or benefit that is more
beneficial to, or is in addition to, a right or benefit provided for such person in
this chapter.
Id.
50
51
52

38 U.S.C. § 4301(a) (1994).
38 U.S.C. § 4301(b) (1994).
See § 4303(3)
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former employees of employers, so that anyone bringing a USERRA claim
against a former employer has standing as an employee to do so.53
USERRA protections apply not only to service members who are currently
employed, but also to those seeking employment.
An “employer” is broadly defined under USERRA. It applies to “any
person, institution, organization, or entity that pays salary or wages for
work performed or that has control over employment opportunities;”54 this
definition includes persons to whom the employer has delegated
employment related responsibilities to.55 In the case of General Silva, who
was fired from his contract position with the United States Customs and
Border Patrol, the independent contracting firm that hired Silva would not
give immunity to Customs from liability under USERRA because
employment related responsibilities were delegated to them.56 Therefore, a

The term “employee” means any person employed by an employer. Such term
includes any person who is a citizen, national, or permanent resident alien of
the United States employed in a workplace in a foreign country by an
employer that is an entity incorporated or otherwise organized in the United
States or that is controlled by an entity organized in the United States, within
the meaning of section 4319(c) of this title.
Id.
53

20 C.F.R. § 1002.5(c) (2006) (defining “employee” to include the former employees
of an employer).
54
38 U.S.C. § 4303(4)(A) (1994) (defining employer to include the Federal Government
and/or State).
55
See Brandsasse v. City of Suffolk, 72 F. Supp. 2d 608 (E.D. Va. 1999) (holding that
the City of Suffolk and its director of personnel, who had authority over hiring and firing
for the city, were both subject to liability as “employers”); But see Jones v. Wolf Camera,
Inc., CIV.A.3:96-CV-2578-D, 1997 WL 22678 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 10, 1997) (holding that
the two supervisors were not persons to whom the employer had delegated the
performance of employment related responsibilities, thereby rejecting defendants’
argument in motion to dismiss that they, as individual supervisors, and not corporate
officers with operational control, could not be held liable as “employers” under
USERRA).
56
See Vogel, supra note 4, at 2.
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company or governmental agency cannot circumvent the reaches of
USERRA by hiring an independent contractor to fulfill its staffing needs.
An individual, who performs a service-related duty in the military, either
voluntarily or involuntarily, is automatically guaranteed the protections
provided by USERRA.57 Employees that leave their civilian employment
due to military service are entitled to certain rights and benefits of
reemployment by the same employer.58 Eligibility for most military benefits
depends on the character of the service. For example, USERRA protections
are not available to those service members who have received a
Dishonorable or Bad Conduct Discharge,59 a Dismissal,60 or an Under Other
Than Honorable Conditions Discharge.61

57

§ 4303(13) (USERRA protects both an individual who volunteers for service and
those who are activated involuntarily to active duty against their own free will):
The term “service in the uniformed services” means the performance of duty
on a voluntary or involuntary basis in a uniformed service under competent
authority and includes active duty, active duty for training, initial active duty
for training, inactive duty training, full-time National Guard duty, a period for
which a person is absent from a position of employment for the purpose of an
examination to determine the fitness of the person to perform any such duty….
Id.

58
38 U.S.C. § 4312(a) (“[A]ny person whose absence from a position of employment is
necessitated by reason of service in the uniformed services shall be entitled to the
reemployment rights and benefits and other employment benefits of this chapter . . .”).
59
See Military Justice 101-Part 3: Enlisted Administrative Separations, ABOUT.COM,
http://usmilitary.about.com/od/justicelawlegislation/l/aadischarge1.htm (last visited Dec.
12, 2012) (This type of discharge is a punishment adjudged as sentence at court martial.
It applies to enlisted members of the armed forces only).
60
Id. A dismissal is the only authorized discharge that can be adjudged against
commissioned officers in a court martial. Id.
61
Id. This characterization of discharge is the lowest that can result from an
administrative involuntary separation from the service. Citation. Each Service Secretary
promulgates regulations regarding procedures and characterization of service for
involuntary separations. Id.
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B. Redressability of Grievances Through USERRA
The service member has five means of redressing grievances through
USERRA regarding employment and reemployment discrimination in
private, state, and federal claims: 1) the Department of Defense’s Employer
Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR); 2) the Department of Labor’s
Veterans’ Education Training Services; 3) referral to the Department of
Justice; 4) the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) in cases involving a federal
employer;62 or 3) a private right of action involving private counsel. The
focus of this article will be on USERRA claims involving violations by
federal employers.
1. Department of Defense’s Employer Support of the Guard and
Reserve (ESGR)
The first option is the ESGR program. It is designed to recognize
employers that implement policies that incentivize and offer support of their
employees’ participation in the armed services.63 The ESGR is an agency
within the DOD whose mission is to gain and maintain employer support
for service members by advocating relevant initiatives, recognizing
outstanding support, increasing awareness of USERRA, and resolving
conflicts between employers and service members.64 The informal ESGR
process has national and local organizational structures to support the
following goals: 1) operate a proactive program directed at US employers,
employees, and communities that ensures understanding and appreciation65
of employees who are service members; 2) assist in preventing, resolving,
or reducing employer and/or employee problems and misunderstandings
62

38 U.S.C. § 4323; See also USERRA Report, supra note 22, at 1.
USERRA Report, supra note 22, at 3.
64
What is ESGR, EMPLOYER SUPPORT OF THE GUARD AND RESERVE, http://www.esgr.
mil/About-ESGR/What-is-ESGR.aspx (last visited Nov. 20, 2012); See USERRA Report,
supra note 22, at 2.
65
USERRA Report, supra note 22, at 2.
63
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that result from Guard or Reserve service, training, or duty requirements
through information services and mediation;66 3) assist in educating Guard
and Reserve members regarding their obligations and responsibilities to
employers;67 and 4) use the military chain of command to promote better
understanding of the importance of maintaining positive working relations
between employers and their Reserve Component employees to sustain
Guard and Reserve participation.68
In order to promote the goals mentioned above, ESGR conducts
awareness and recognition programs aimed at employers of service
members to engender support for military service.69 Nevertheless,
participation in these programs remains voluntary on the part of the
employer, thus limiting its effectiveness to those employers willing to
commit. Employers that choose to pledge support must sign a Statement of
Support.70 An employer that signs a Statement of Support pledges that he or
she will adhere to the following: 1) fully recognize, honor, and enforce
USERRA; 2) ensure managers and supervisors have the tools they need to
effectively manage those employees who serve in the armed services; and
66

Id.
See id.; See also Frequently Asked Questions, EMPLOYER SUPPORT OF THE GUARD
AND RESERVE, http://www.esgr.mil/USERRA/Frequently-Asked-Questions.aspx (last
visited Nov. 21, 2012)

67

In general, if the employee has been absent from a position of civilian
employment by reason of service in the uniformed services, he or she will be
eligible for reemployment under USERRA by meeting the following criteria:
1) The employer had advance notice of the employee’s military obligation; 2)
The employee has been away from this employer five years or less due to
military obligations (excluding exemptions); 3) The employee returns to work
in a timely manner as defined under USERRA; and 4) The employee has not
been separated from uniformed services with a disqualifying discharge or
under other than honorable conditions.
Id.

68
69
70

USERRA Report, supra note 22, at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id.
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3) continually recognize and support service members and their families in
peace, in crisis, and in war.71 Once an employer pledges to honor and
enforce USERRA, it is entered into the ESGR’s awards program.
Individual supervisors are eligible for several ESGR awards based on
their pledge to enforce USERRA. For example, the Patriot Award is offered
to individual supervisors, while the annual Secretary of Defense Employer
Support Freedom Award is awarded to the most outstanding employers in
the nation.72 During the fiscal year 2011, ESGR awarded 16,560 supervisors
with the Patriot Award and 15 employers with the Secretary of Defense
Employer Support Freedom Award.73 Not a single federal employer was
among ESGR award recipients. This minor discrepancy, albeit revealing,
counteracts the federal government’s aim to be a “model employer”74 in
carrying out the USERRA provisions.
The ESGR process gives the service member the opportunity to confront
USERRA violations in an informal setting. The ESGR Ombudsmen75
Services Program is the most informal level at which resolutions for
USERRA claims may be achieved.76 The Ombudsman services offered
through ESGR are the primary means of assisting service members with
USERRA related claims.77 The Ombudsman Services Program provides
education, information, and neutral third-party services in order to resolve

71

Id.
Id.
73
DEP’T OF DEF., EMPLOYER SUPPORT OF THE GUARD AND RESERVE 2011 YEAR IN
REVIEW 15 (2012), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Personnel_and_Personnel
_Readiness/Personnel/13-F-0014_ESGR_Year_in_Review_FY11.pdf;
See
Past
Recipients, THE FREEDOM AWARD, http://www.FreedomAward.mil/CurrentRecipients
View.aspx (last visited Nov. 23, 2012) for a list of the specific employers recognized.
74
38 U.S.C. § 4301.
75
See, e.g., MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2005 ) (defining
“ombudsman” as “one that investigates, reports on, and helps settle complaints”).
76
USERRA Report, supra note 22, at 1.
77
Id. at 3.
72
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USERRA conflicts.78 However, ESGR is not an enforcement agency,
meaning any conclusions reached by the Ombudsman are not binding by
law. Moreover, the investigations and settlements undertaken by the ESGR
and the Ombudsman are not considered to be a part of the litigation
process.79 Thus, service members are able to file directly with Department
of Labor’s Veterans’ Education Training Services (VETS), which has
Congressional authority to investigate USERRA violations and legal
authority to subpoena records during an investigation.80
2. Department of Labor’s Veterans’ Education Training Services
(VETS)
The second means of redressing grievances through USERRA is a formal
investigation by the VETS. If the issue cannot be resolved with the ESGR,
or if the individual opts to bypass the informal stage, then VETS receives
and formally investigates the claim.81 If the service member decides to file a
claim through VETS, he or she must complete a questionnaire that asks
about military information, the employer’s information, and whether the
claim relates to employment or reemployment discrimination.82 Once the
78
79
80

Id.
Id.
See 38 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994).
The Secretary (through the Veterans’ Employment and Training Service) shall
provide assistance to any person with respect to the employment and
reemployment rights and benefits to which such person is entitled under this
chapter. In providing such assistance, the Secretary may request the assistance
of existing Federal and State agencies engaged in similar or related activities
and utilize the assistance of volunteers.

Id. See Veterans’ Employment and Training Services (VETS), U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR.,
http://www.dol.gov/vets/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2012); See also USERRA Report, supra
note 22, at 4.
81
USERRA Report, supra note 22, at 1.
82
VETS/USERRA/VP Form 1010, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR., http://www.dol.gov/elaws
/vets/vetpref/vets-1010.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2012) (showing an example of the form
VETS requires reservists complete in order to receive Department of Labor assistance in
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service member files the complaint, VETS conducts an investigation.83
There is no threshold requirement for VETS to meet in order to initiate a
formal investigation. If VETS determines that the employer has violated
USERRA in any capacity, then it makes “reasonable efforts” to ensure the
employer is in compliance with the Act.84 Should the employer fail to
comply with USERRA based on VETS recommendations, then, at the
service member’s request, VETS has the option to work with the
Department of Labor’s Solicitor’s office (SOL). SOL provides legal
analysis and recommendations regarding the merit of claims and refers
cases to the United State’s Attorney General’s office.85
3. The Department of Justice (DOJ)
The third means of redressing grievances if the service member is not
satisfied with the outcome reached by VETS is to have the case referred to
the DOJ for consideration of legal representation at no cost to the service

resolving their grievance. It contains seven questions regarding reemployment problems
and three questions regarding hiring discrimination).
83
See Employees’ Benefits, 20 C.F.R. § 1002.289 (2006).
In carrying out any investigation, VETS has, at all reasonable times,
reasonable access to and the right to interview persons with information
relevant to the investigation. VETS also has reasonable access to, for purposes
of examination, the right to copy and receive any documents of any person or
employer that VETS considers relevant to the investigation.
Id.
84
85

See id.
See 38 U.S.C. § 4323(a)(1) (1994).
If the Attorney General is reasonably satisfied that the person on whose behalf
the complaint is referred is entitled to the rights or benefits sought, the
Attorney General may appear on behalf of, and act as attorney for, the person
on whose behalf the complaint is submitted and commence an action for relief
under this chapter for such person.

Id.
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member.86 Referred cases to the DOJ are those involving state or local
government employers.87 If the Attorney General is reasonably satisfied that
the service member is entitled to relief, then the DOJ’s prosecutorial
authority may be asserted, and the DOJ may commence an action in federal
court on behalf of the service member.88 The DOJ brings an action in the
name of the United States in a state court only if the employer is the state;89
in any other instance, the United States files suit in the name of the service
member.90 This structure is due to jurisdictional concerns. Under USERRA,
a federal district court lacks jurisdiction over a USERRA action brought by
an individual against a state as an employer. The plain language of the
statute and its legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended that
actions brought by individuals against a state be commenced in state court.91
However, recent recommendations from DOL and DOJ suggest that all
USERRA claims—not just those against state employers—be handled more
like other civil rights laws where the United States serves as the plaintiff.92
4. The Office of Special Counsel (OSC)
In cases involving federal employers violating USERRA, the Office of
Special Counsel’s (OSC) enforcement authority is implicated.93 The OSC is
86

USERRA Report, supra note 22, at 1.
Id. at 6 (Each referral includes: (1) the VETS investigative file; and (2) a
memorandum analyzing the case and providing a recommendation based upon the facts
and the law, as to whether representation should be provided or declined).
88
Id. at 5.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
See Townsend v. Univ. of Alaska, 543 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that the
federal district court lacks jurisdiction over USERRA actions by individuals against state
as employers).
92
USERRA Report, supra note 22, at 24.
93
38 U.S.C. § 4324(a)(1) (2010) (“A person . . . may request that the Secretary refer the
complaint for litigation before the Merit Systems Protection Board. Not later than 60 days
after the date the Secretary receives such a request, the Secretary shall refer the complaint
to the Office of Special Counsel . . .”).
87
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an independent federal investigative and prosecutorial agency whose
authority derives completely from USERRA.94 If the Special Counsel is
reasonably satisfied that the service member is entitled to relief under
USERRA, then, upon the request of the service member, it may appear on
behalf of and act as attorney for him or her in front of the Merit Systems
Protection Board (MSPB).95 However, as discussed below, the service
member may elect to proceed with private counsel in front of the MSPB.96
The MSPB is an independent, quasi-judicial agency in the Executive
branch97 created to protect federal merit systems and the rights of
individuals within those systems.98 MSPB carries out its statutory
responsibilities and authorities primarily by adjudicating individual
employee appeals. It also reviews the actions of the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) to assess the degree to which those actions may affect
merit.99 If the Board determines that the federal employer has not complied
with the provisions of USERRA, then it may enter an order requiring the
federal employer to comply and compensate such person for any loss of
wages or benefits suffered due to the lack of prompt compliance.100

94
See Introduction to OSC, U.S. OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL, http://www.osc.gov
/Intro.htm (last updated Jan. 21, 2010) for a more thorough discussion of the Office of
Special Counsel.
95
38 U.S.C. § 4324(2)(A).
96
See id. at (b) (“A person may submit a complaint against a Federal executive agency
or the Office of Personnel Management under this subchapter directly to the Merit
Systems Protection Board if that person . . .”).
97
See About MSPB, U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., http://www.mspb.gov/About/about.htm
(last visited Jan. 2, 2013) for a more thorough description of the MSPB.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
38 U.S.C. § 4324(c)(2)

If the Board determines that a Federal executive agency or the Office of
Personnel Management has not complied with the provisions of this chapter
relating to the employment or reemployment of a person by the agency, the
Board shall enter an order requiring the agency or Office to comply with such
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In addition, the MSPB has discretion to award attorney’s fees and
litigation costs.101 However, this discretion has presented issues that are
twofold. First, USERRA claimants need attorneys to help them navigate the
adversarial process such as filing briefs with the court or making arguments
before the judge. Attorneys handling such matters should not be expected to
offer his or her services without the guarantee of being compensated. The
attorney fee provision was implemented to incentivize attorney
involvement; however, the impact of this incentive is diminished by the
realization that the assurance of attorney’s fees is not guaranteed.102 Second,
courts are more likely not to disturb the MSPB’s decision not to award
attorney’s fees unless such decision is (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without
procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or (3)
unsupported by substantial evidence.103

provisions and to compensate such person for any loss of wages or benefits
suffered by such person by reason of such lack of compliance.
Id.
101

See id. § 4324(c)(4).
If the Board determines as a result of a hearing or adjudication conducted
pursuant to a complaint submitted by a person directly to the Board pursuant to
subsection (b) that such person is entitled to an order referred to in paragraph
(2), the Board may, in its discretion, award such person reasonable attorney
fees, expert witness fees, and other litigation expenses.

Id.
102

TULLY, supra note 29, at 12.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(c)(1)-(3) (1978); accord Phillips v. U.S. Postal Serv., 695 F.2d 1389,
1390 (Fed.Cir.1982); See also, Jacobsen v. Dep’t of Justice, 500 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (holding that USERRA Section 4324(c)(4) does not require that the petitioner
be a “prevailing party” who may only be awarded attorney fees in the “interest of
justice”); See also Sacco v. U.S., 452 F.3d 1305, 1309 (Fed.Cir. 2006) (holding that
rather, section 4324(c)(4) merely requires that the Board have issued an “order” requiring
the agency to correct its violation of USERRA. Congress left the decision whether to
award reasonable attorney fees, expert witness fees, and other litigation expenses to the
Board’s discretion. In such a case where Congress left the precise application of a fees103
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5. Assistance of Private Counsel
The fifth option of redressing grievances is the choice to file a complaint
directly against an employer with the assistance of private counsel.104 If the
employer is either a private company or the local government, then the
complaint is filed in any federal district where the employer maintains a
place of business.105 Accordingly, if a service member elects to initiate a
private suit against an employer, then no court costs or fees will be charged
to the service member claiming USERRA violations.106 However, if the
complaint is against a federal employer, then it must be filed with the
MSPB.107
The remedies a court can provide vary. Relief may include forcing the
employer to hire the service member, requiring the employer to pay the
service member for back wages or benefits lost due to the employer’s
failure to comply with USERRA; or, if the court determines that the
employer’s actions were willful, then it may require the employer to pay the
service member liquidated damages in the form of actual damages.108
However, actual damages may be extremely small if the USERRA claimant
who was unlawfully denied reemployment has quickly found another job
with another employer that pays just the same or more.109 Additionally, the
court has the discretion to award attorney and expert witness fees to a
permitting provision to the Board’s discretion, and in the absence of any Constitutional
challenge thereto, we accord broad deference to the Board’s decision to deny fees).
104
A reservist files their complaint in federal court if the employer is a private entity and
files in state court if the employer is a state government entity. See 38 U.S.C. §
4323(b)(1)-(3).
105
38 U.S.C. §4323(c)(2); A political subdivision of a state is deemed to be a private
employer for purposes of USERRA enforcement under §4323. See 38 U.S.C. §4323(i).
Political subdivisions of states do not have Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Hopkins
v. Clemson Agric. College, 221 U.S. 636, 645 (1911).
106
See id. § 4323(d).
107
See generally 38 U.S.C. §4324.
108
Id.
109
Tully, supra note 29, at 10.
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service member who prevails in a private right of action under USERRA.110
The benefit in such an award is that the service member is not deterred from
seeking out private counsel; however, a potential downside is that the
service member may be on the hook for attorney’s fees if he or she fails to
prevail.
A private right of action brought under USERRA differs tremendously
than a private right of action under a Title VII claim. For instance, under
Title VII, a potential plaintiff bringing the claim must first exhaust his or
her administrative remedies,111 such as presenting the claim before the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or its state or local
equivalent.112 No such requirement exists under USERRA. A service
member filing a USERRA claim need not exhaust the administrative
remedies113 available to him or her before seeking a private right of
action.114 A private right of action would expedite the process and ensure
that the service member has his or her claim heard in front of a court.
6. Court’s Burden-Shifting Analysis
When a service member claims that an employer violated USERRA’s
provisions, courts apply a burden-shifting analysis to decide whether the

110

See 38 U.S.C. § 4323(h)(2).
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of this chapter by a person
under subsection (a)(2) who obtained private counsel for such action or
proceeding, the court may award any such person who prevails in such action
or proceeding reasonable attorney fees, expert witness fees, and other litigation
expenses.

Id.
111

Discrimination: Overview-Title VII, PRACTICAL LAW COMPANY (PLC) (2013),
http://us.practicallaw.com/3-503-3975#a1052369 (last visited Dec. 15, 2013).
112
Id.
113
See supra Part II.B.1-2.
114
Harvey Sanders & Jeri Hagen, Policies Guide Employers, Reservists, SANDERS &
SANDERS (Nov. 5, 2001), http://www.wnyemploymentlaw.com/Article7.shtml.
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employer used the service member’s military service as a basis for its
adverse employment decision.115 When applying this burden-shifting
analysis, courts interpret USERRA liberally in favor of the service
member.116 The court begins its analysis when the service member
establishes a prima facie case of discrimination.117 This is accomplished by
a showing of a preponderance of the evidence that the service member’s
military status was a motivating factor in the employer’s adverse
employment decision,118 though it does not have to be the sole cause for the
employer’s decision.119 A motivating factor “is one of the factors that a
truthful employer would list if asked for the reasons for its decision.”120
Once the service member successfully establishes a prima facie case under
USERRA, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the service
member’s protected status was not a motivating factor in the adverse
employment decision.121 For instance, in the case of General Silva, all he
had to do was allege that the United States Customs and Border Patrol fired
him because of his military status. Then, the burden would shift to Customs
to offer proof that General Silva’s military status did not play a role in its
decision to release him.
C. Defenses
USERRA provides four statutory defenses that an employer can use to
refuse reemployment to a service member returning from military service.
The following are the defenses:
115

See Sheehan v. Dep’t of the Navy, 240 F.3d 1009, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (describing
USERRA’s burden-shifting analysis).
116
McGuire v. United Parcel Serv., 152 F.3d 673, 676 (7th Cir. 1998).
117
Sheehan, 240 F.3d at 1013 n.3.
118
Id. at 1013.
119
Sanguinetti v. United Parcel Serv., 114 Fla. Supp. 2d 1313, 1318 (S.D. Fla. 2000),
aff’d, 254 F.3d 75 (11th Cir. 2001).
120
Id. (quoting Brandsasse v. City of Suffolk, 72 F. Supp. 2d 608, 617 (E.D. Va. 1999)).
121
Brandsasse, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 617.
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Whether the service member is “qualified” for the position upon
return from service;122
Whether the employer’s circumstances have changed so much that
it would be impossible or unreasonable to reemploy the service
member;123
Whether the employer would suffer undue hardship in reemploying
the service member;124 and
Whether the deployment was for only a brief, nonrecurring period
and there was no expectation that employment was to continue
indefinitely for an extended period of time.125
The aforementioned defenses are not exhaustive by any means. Other
defenses that are conceivable consist of the following: whether the service
member’s classification was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision;
whether the employer would have taken the same action regardless of the
service member’s status; and last but not least, whether the service member
actually reapplied for the position in the appropriate manner and within the
allotted time frame. Each of these defenses can prove to be barriers to
employment and reemployment.
For instance, an employer is not required to reemploy an otherwise
eligible returning service member if the employer’s “circumstances have so
changed as to make such reemployment impossible or unreasonable.”126
This exception, however, has been narrowly construed. An employer’s
defense that the “mere low work load, layoffs, and hiring freeze” precluded
122

See 38 U.S.C. § 4312(f)(4) (“requests for documentation cannot be interposed for the
purposes of delay or avoidance by requiring documentation that does not exist or that
may not be readily available”).
123
See id. § 4312(d)(1)(A). This exception has been interpreted to avoid the necessity of
an employer having to create a useless job. See, e.g., Cole v. Swint, 961 F.2d 58, 60 (5th
Cir. 1997).
124
§ 4312(d)(1)(B).
125
§ 4312(d)(1)(C).
126
§ 4312(d)(1)(A).
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it from rehiring a returning service member was found to be insufficient by
a court to prevail against a USERRA claim.127 Another court decision
recited a similar principle:
The statutory exemption excusing a refusal to re-employ a veteran
where reinstatement would be unreasonable is a very limited
exception to be applied only where reinstatement would require
creation of a useless job or where there has been a reduction in the
work force that would reasonably have included the veteran.128
Therefore, a court will likely not render reemployment impossible or
unreasonable merely because another employee occupies the returning
service member’s position.
In the case of an employer raising the defense of “undue hardship,” he or
she is not required to reemploy a returning service member if such
employment would impose an unreasonable burden on the employer.129 In
determining whether the employer would suffer undue hardship, courts tend
to consider the nature and costs of the necessary action, the overall financial
resources of the employer, and the size of the employer in terms of its
employees and facilities.130 Thus, under the provisions of USERRA, an
employer must make reasonable efforts, including refresher training, to
accommodate a returning service member, unless doing so would cause an
“undue hardship” to the employer.131
An employer is not required to reemploy an otherwise eligible returning
service member if that service member, prior to departing for service, had
only been employed for a brief, non-recurrent period; and there is no

127
See Dunlap v. Grupo Antolin Kentucky, Inc., No. 5:05-CV-00029-R, 2007 WL
855335, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 14, 2007).
128
Lapine v. Town of Wellesley, 167 F. Supp. 2d 132, 138 (D. Mass. 2001) (quoting
Davis v. Halifax County Sch. Sys., 508 F. Supp. 966, 968 (E.D.N.C. 1981)).
129
38 U.S.C. § 4312(d)(1)(B).
130
Id.
131
Id.
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reasonable expectation that such employment will continue indefinitely or
for a significant period.132 A reasonable expectation that employment would
continue indefinitely would be an employment agreement that explicitly or
implicitly promises the employee a specific duration of employment. The
burden of proof, however, is on the employer to show that the employment
was in fact brief and non-recurrent.133

III. PROPOSALS TO BOLSTER THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S
COMPLIANCE WITH USERRA
The Federal Government, as our Nation’s largest employer, has a
responsibility to adopt best practices with respect to employing
returning service members. Attracting and retaining the best talent
means ensuring fair treatment for individuals who have served our
country. Close attention must be paid to our returning service
members to ensure that we protect their reemployment rights, and
effectively manage their reintegration when they return from
service.134
On July 19, 2012, President Barack Obama expressed in a Presidential
Memorandum the importance of the federal government’s role in ensuring
the success of USERRA and the need to be a “model employer.”135
However, this is not new language. As a matter of fact, the call for the
federal government to be a model employer has been discussed and fought
for since the inception of USERRA.136 For instance, three years prior to the
passage of USERRA, members of the Senate stressed the importance that
the federal government not only be a model employer, but that it also needs

132

See 38 U.S.C. § 4312(d)(2).
See id.
134
Presidential Memo, supra note 23.
135
See id.
136
See § 4301(b).
133
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to be the model employer.137 Moreover, in the very same hearing before the
Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Reserve Affairs—Stephen M. Duncan—reemphasized that the proposed
new chapter (38 U.S.C. § 4324) would make it clear that the federal
government should be a model employer with respect to the purposes and
policies set out in the employment rights law for members of the uniformed
services.138
While USERRA preempts any state law that is more restrictive, it does
not preempt any laws that provide greater protections to service
members.139 Therefore, it is beneficial to study a few of the states that
provide greater protections in certain areas than USERRA for service
members in order to apply the same principles to bolster the federal
government’s compliance. Most states have their own version of USERRAlike laws that mirror the federal statute. However, a few state laws differ on
some approaches, particularly with remedies. Accordingly, an examination
137

Legislation Relating to Reemployment Rights, Educational Assistance, and the U.S.
Court of Veterans Appeals: Hearing Before the Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 102nd Cong.
20 (1991) (statement of Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. Schiffer).
Mr. Schiffer: I think, first of all, Mr. Chairman, without saying that any
individual case is not important, that the problem arises more in the abstract, in
all honesty, than it does in reality. We have not the slightest quarrel with the
notion that the Federal Government should be not just a model employer but
indeed the model employer.
Id.

138

Legislation Relating to Reemployment Rights, Educational Assistance, and the U.S.
Court of Veterans Appeals: Hearing Before the Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 102nd Cong.
184 (1991) (statement of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs Duncan).
Mr. Duncan: The proposed new chapter would make it clear that the federal
government should be a model employer with respect to the purposes and
policies set out in the employment rights law for members of the uniformed
services.
Id.
139

See 38 U.S.C. § 4302(b).
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of Wyoming, Missouri, and Washington State USERRA-like laws will shed
light on unique variations to determine whether the principles from these
laws could possibly be used to help bolster the federal government’s
compliance with USERRA.
Three options exist to help bolster the federal government’s compliance
with USERRA and eradicate its failures from the numbers of the past fiscal
year.140 These options are 1) creating an economic incentive that would
require federal employers to pay as much damages as a state or private
employer; 2) considering implementing a criminal remedy that would make
it a misdemeanor for a federal employer to violate the provisions of
USERRA; and 3) making employee-employer contracts that bind
employees into mandatory arbitration unenforceable for USERRA disputes.
A. Create an Economic Incentive to Encourage Compliance Based on
Wyoming’s Model
The Wyoming version of USERRA is codified in the Military Service
Relief Act of 1998 (MSRA).141 The economic incentives utilized to bolster
enforcement via MSRA should be implemented into the federal scheme.
MSRA provides very similar employment protections for service members
as USERRA. Under MSRA, the policy driving the law is “that its citizens
who serve their country and state and who leave their employment, homes,
and education shall not be penalized nor economically disadvantaged
because of such service.”142 Similar to USERRA, the purpose of MSRA is
“to prevent [service members] from being disadvantaged and to prohibit
discrimination against persons because of their uniformed services when
they return to civilian life.”143
140

See USERRA Report, supra note 23, at 13 for a statistical analysis breakdown of
federal government employers that have violated USERRA for the FY 2011.
141
See generally WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-11-101-24 (1998).
142
§ 19-11-102(a).
143
§ 19-11-102(b).
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There are two key differences between MSRA and USERRA: 1) award
of damages and 2) attorney’s fees. First, state district courts have the
authority to order an employer to comply with MSRA, award compensation
for lost wages and benefits stemming from the alleged MSRA violations,
and award liquidated damages for willful violations.144 This is significant
because, unlike USERRA where a federal employer may only be liable for
back pay,145 MSRA makes the employer liable not only for back pay, but
also for liquidated damages—double damages.146
Second, there is a key difference in that MSRA has a provision for an
award of litigation costs and attorney’s fees. An award of attorney’s fees is
mandated under MSRA147 whereas it is discretionary under USERRA.148 If
the action is based on the anti-discrimination or reinstatement provisions,
then the prevailing service member will be awarded a judgment for
administrative or litigation costs incurred in connection with the action, in
addition to attorney’s fees.149 This is significant because the award of
attorney’s fees incentivizes lawyers to accept MSRA involved claims
without worrying about compensation.
As it stands right now, if the MSPB determines that a federal employer
has not complied with the provisions of USERRA, then it will enter an
144

See id. § 19-11-121(b)(i)-(iii) (describing the term, “double damages”).
See 38 U.S.C. § 4324(c)(2) (requiring the Board shall enter an order requiring the
agency or Office to comply with such provisions and to compensate such person for any
loss of wages or benefits suffered by such person by reason of such lack of compliance).
146
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 19-11-121(b)(i)-(iii) (1998).
147
§ 19-11-123.
148
See 38 U.S.C. § 4324(c)(4) (leaving the award of attorney’s fees and other litigation
costs in the hands of the MSPB).
149
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 19-11-105(a)(i)-(ii) The statute requires the service member to
first exhaust an employer’s internal administrative remedies, if any, and the service
member must refrain from “unreasonably protract[ing] such proceeding.” Id. at (b), (d).
Litigation costs include court costs, expert witness fees (with some conditions), costs
connected with any study or report necessary to prepare the party’s case, and attorney’s
fees not to exceed $75.00 per hour, unless a higher rate is approved by the court. Id. at
(e)(vi)(A)-(C).
145
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order requiring the agency to comply with the provisions and to compensate
the service member for any loss of wages or benefits suffered due to lack of
compliance.150 Additionally, if the MSPB determines as a result of the
hearing or adjudication conducted pursuant to the complaint submitted by a
service member directly, the MSPB may, in its discretion, award the service
member reasonable attorney fees, expert witness fees, and other litigation
expenses.151 The key language here is “may.” In other words, where the
federal government is an employer, USERRA as it stands might not allow a
service member to recover for attorney’s fees and other litigation
expenses.152 The inability to recover for attorney’s fees and other litigation
costs can be highly problematic, especially since it is highly likely that the
service member bringing this action has no other source of income to
support litigation costs, let alone everyday living expenses. Additionally,
there is no section in the statutory language allowing for the recovery of
liquidated damages due to willful violations.
The absence of such language, or section, shows why it is imperative to
adopt and implement a remedy similar to the one listed in Wyoming’s
MSRA. Under MSRA, a service member is awarded, in conjunction with
lost wages and benefits, liquidated damages for willful violations.153 For
instance, if the service member is fired from his or her job in violation of
USERRA, and then finds another job a month or so later with loss of wages
totaling $600, then under MSRA the service member could recover that
$600 in addition to liquidated damages that may equal the same amount or
more if the violation was willful. However, under USERRA, the service
member that suffered unemployment from the federal government in a

150

§ 4324(c)(2).
§ 4324(c)(4).
152
Id.
153
See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 19-11-121 (b)(i)-(iii) (“double damages”).
151
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similar scenario would only be able to recover the $600 and not the
liquidated damages.
Thus, violators of MSRA’s provisions are required to pay double the
damages. If the federal government can implement some sort of doubledamage remedy similar to Wyoming’s MSRA, then it would likely
incentivize the federal government to comply with USERRA, especially
since government agencies are working with an ever decreasing budget and
the need to be cost-efficient should compel compliance. Similarly,
USERRA’s ineffectiveness to mandate mandatory award of attorney’s fees
and litigation costs by leaving such a decision to the discretion of the MSPB
proves quite insensitive to the needs of service members.154 At this point in
the process, the service member would have gone through several channels
before even reaching the MSPB, thus expending a great deal of financial
resources to do so.155 Therefore, where Wyoming’s MSRA makes it
mandatory to award attorney’s fees and other litigation costs associated
with the claim, such as expert witnesses and special tests, USERRA should
follow suit.156 Instead of leaving sole discretion in the hands of the MSPB to
determine whether the service member is entitled to attorney’s fees,
USERRA should be written to mandate such an award, thus reducing the
risk of placing the service member in a financial bind that normally
accompanies such claims.
B. “Criminal” Remedy Based on the Missouri and Washington State Model
The second solution would compel federal employers’ compliance with
USERRA through the use of a criminal remedy. As it stands, the remedies
154

See 38 U.S.C. § 4324(c)(4) (2010) (the MSPB has discretion to either award attorney’s
fees and other litigation costs or not).
155
The service member would have gone through ESGR, DOL VETS, OSC, and then
finally the MSPB. See supra Part II.
156
See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 19-11-123 for the statutory language regarding mandatory
award of attorney’s fees.
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that are available under the existing USERRA provisions apply only to civil
damages.157 Currently, federal employers are only liable for lost wages and
benefits and perhaps attorney’s fees if the MSPB decides to award it.158
Thus, I am proposing that USERRA adopts the Missouri and Washington
criminal remedy approach to handling claims involving USERRA-like
actions.
1. The Missouri Approach
Missouri offers a criminal solution that should be considered when
discussing ways to compel federal government compliance with USERRA.
In Missouri, it is considered a misdemeanor for any officer or agent of the
state or of any county, municipality, school district, or other political
subdivision to refuse to permit service members to take military leaves of
absence from employment up to 15 calendar days per fiscal year without
loss of pay, time, regular leave, impairment of efficiency rating, or any
other rights or benefits.159 More specifically, the Missouri statute gives state
public employees the optional remedy of seeking criminal charges against a
public employer for refusing to pay an employee for military leave up to 15
calendar days.
2. The Washington Approach
Washington State’s Militia Affairs statute (MA) would add the threat of a
criminal proceeding and a willful element to the federal USERRA
provisions. By adding a willful element, it would only allow for those
federal employers that willfully violate USERRA to be criminally

157

See generally 38 U.S.C. § 4324 (2010).
Id.
159
See MO. ANN. STAT. § 105.270 (1984) (The criminal provision of subsection three
arguably applies only to subsection three, but it applies to “any of the provisions of this
section”).
158
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charged.160 MA forbids an employer from willfully depriving a member of
the Washington Army Reserve or National Guard of employment or
reemployment.161 The statute makes it a crime to willfully deprive the
service member of employment.162
This willful standard is undeniably more stringent than USERRA’s
“motivating factor” requirement.163 Under the MA statute, a service
member must prove that the employer did not hire him solely because he or
she did not want to hire national guardsman, whereas under USERRA, the
service member only has to show that his or her status was one reason for
not being hired or rehired.164 If the service member successfully proves that
an employer willfully discriminated against him or her, then the court must
either fine the employer $500 or impose a six month jail term to the
employer.165
Although a fine under Washington law is significantly less than the large
sums of money awarded under USERRA, an important takeaway to
implement into USERRA in order to bolster the federal government’s
compliance would be its threat of criminal charges.166 Similar to the threat
of criminal proceedings in Missouri’s MSRA, Washington State’s MA
statute would have a similar effect. However, before implementing the
threat of criminal charges, USERRA would have to adopt the same
“willful” language contained in Washington’s MA statute in order to
160

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 38.04.010-040 (1989).
§ 38.40.040; See, e.g., § 38.40.050 (forbidding an employer from discharging a
national guardsman employee because of their National Guard status). Washington law
also forbids any organization, business, or club from barring a national guardsman from
admission because of their status. Id.; See also § 38.40.110 (the punishment for such a
violation is a $100 fine and a sanction barring them from conducting business for 30
days).
162
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 38.40.040.
163
Cf. 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c)(1) (1996).
164
Compare WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 38.40.040, with 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c)(1).
165
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 38.40.040.
166
See id.
161
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prevent its abuse and answer the critics who may think that criminal charges
are too extreme for an employer who may not intentionally fire a service
member because of his or her military status.

a.) A Case Against the Civil Remedy-Only Approach for Federal
Employer Violators
This “criminal” remedy may seem extreme, considering the fact that an
employer may face criminal misdemeanor charges for refusing to pay a
service member two weeks worth of pay. As it stands now, a federal
employer who violates USERRA is subject to the very same civil penalties
as a state or private employer albeit one exception: the federal employer is
not required to provide for liquidated damages.167 This is problematic
because the federal employer is only liable for actual damages, which may
be extremely small in cases where the fired service member finds
employment relatively quickly. For instance, if a service member who was
fired finds a job within a week, and the damages for one week of
unemployment are $600, then the federal employer will only be liable for
that amount, which is $600, and nothing more.
In 2007, the Pentagon released data indicating that approximately 11,000
service members were denied prompt reemployment, while an additional
22,000 service members lost seniority or pay when they returned.168 Yet,
surveys showed that only 23 percent of those members sought help via
USERRA while a disturbing 77 percent just thought it wasn’t even worth
167

See § 4324(c)(2) (2010) (requiring federal government employers only to pay lost
wages); See also Samuel F. Wright & Greg T. Rinckey, `Welcome Home, You’re Fired’:
A Harsh Reality Awaits Many Returning Veterans Who Find Themselves Locked Out of
the Civilian Jobs They Had to Leave When They Deployed; the Law Guarantees That
They Can Return to Those Jobs, TRIAL, 27 (2008).
168
Col. Steve Strobridge, As I See it-Put More Teeth in USERRA, MILITARY OFFICERS
ASS’N OF AM. (MOAA) (Dec. 2007), http://www.moaa.org/main_article.aspx?id=2944.
/main_article.aspx?id=2944 (describing a Pentagon data released to the Senate Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee hearing in Nov. 2007).
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the fight and that such a claim wouldn’t make much of a difference.169 This
data reveals that the civil remedies currently available under USERRA,
specifically regarding federal employers, are not the best available options.

b.) A Case for a Criminal Approach to USERRA Violations Involving
Federal Employers
National security concerns are implicated once an employer violates
USERRA; the weight of public policy cannot go unheard. This is
particularly true when the federal government is the employer. The policies
of maintaining a trained and prepared national military force, ensuring
national security, and encouraging individuals to volunteer for reserve duty
justifies the “criminal” remedy in cases where the employer indirectly
hinders national military readiness. This idea is embodied in the Missouri
law, which seems to weigh national security concerns much more heavily
than the appearance of extreme corrective behavior by labeling an employer
a criminal.
Being labeled a criminal offender in America (regardless of whether for a
misdemeanor or felony) is essentially the modern equivalent to a “scarlet
letter”170 because of the stigma171 attached to such a conviction. Also known
as the “collateral sentencing consequences” of a criminal record,172

169

Id. (explaining that a majority of service members chose not to file complaints because
they “thought it wasn’t worth the fight, didn’t know how to file a complaint, didn’t think
it would make any difference, or feared reprisal from their employer”).
170
Megan C. Kurlychek, Robert Brame & Shawn D. Bushway, Scarlet Letters and
Recidivism: Does an Old Criminal Record Predict Future Offending?, 5 CRIMINOLOGY
& PUB. POLICY 1101 (2006).
171
See generally Eric Rasmusen, Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality,
39 J. L. & ECON. 519, 520 (1996) (defining “stigma” as “the reluctance [of people] to
interact with [a person] who has a criminal record . . . [s]tigma can be either economic [ ]
or social”).
172
Kurlychek et al., supra note 170, at 484 (“Collateral consequences are ethically, if not
legally, problematic because they amplify punishment beyond the sanctions imposed by
the criminal justice system”).
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individuals with a criminal record are frequently denied many
socioeconomic opportunities that many without a record take for granted,
such as license privileges and the attainment of employment.173
A 2001 study of 619 Los Angeles employers that focused on the
employers’ prospective willingness to hire ex-offenders and their actual
hiring of ex-offenders further revealed the collateral effect of a criminal
record.174 Over 40 percent of employers indicated that they would
“probably not” or “definitely not” be willing to hire an applicant with a
criminal record, about 35 percent indicated that their response “depends on
the crime,” and only about 20 percent indicated that they would “definitely”
or “probably” consider an applicant with a criminal history.175 The most
intriguing part of this study was that the industries most willing to and who
actually hired ex-offenders were “skewed towards manufacturing,
construction, and transportation, or those industries that likely have fewer
jobs that require customer contact.”176 Moreover, employers willing to hire
ex-offenders were “disproportionately those with a large fraction of
unskilled jobs” and those that were “large in size” and had a “high turnover
rate.”177 None of the employers that expressed their willingness to hire an
ex-offender were federal government employers.
Missouri considers it a criminal offense for any officer or agent of the
state or of any county, municipality, school district, or other political

173

Devah Pager, Double Jeopardy: Race, Crime, and Getting a Job, 2005 WIS. L. REV.
617, 620–21 (2005).
174
See generally Harry J. Holzer, Steven Raphael & Michael A. Stoll, Employer Demand
for Ex-Offenders: Recent Evidence from Los Angeles (URBAN INSTITUTE 2013),
available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/410779_ExOffenders.pdf (last updated
Mar. 1, 2003).
175
Id. at 6–9 (Only “about 20 percent of employers responded that they hired at least one
ex-offender over the past year.” Suggesting, a “fear of litigation may substantially deter
employers from hiring applicants with criminal history records”).
176
Id. at 12.
177
Id.
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subdivision to refuse to permit service members to take military leaves of
absence from employment up to 15 calendar days per fiscal year without
loss of pay, time, regular leave, impairment of efficiency rating, or any
other rights or benefits.178 Washington’s MA has similar protections to
Missouri’s MSRA; in Washington, a willful deprivation of employment
may lead to a fine or six months imprisonment.179
An integration of a similar provision allowing the MSPB to order
criminal convictions for willful violators of the USERRA provisions would
hasten compliance on the part of the federal employer. Depending on the
federal government agency the claim is being filed against, the employer
who violated the service member’s rights may lose his or her job because of
the stringent employment requirements of that agency. For federal
government agencies that require security clearances, continuous
employment is based on passing a background check.180 Difficulties in
passing these background checks vary on the level of security clearance
needed, but the requirement results in many qualified personnel being
denied employment because of a criminal record.181 Thus, it would be
imperative for the federal employer to comply with the provisions of
USERRA out of fear of being stigmatized a criminal and possibly relieved
of duty permanently due to the inability to obtain or maintain a security
clearance. Moreover, as mentioned above, national military readiness in the
form of national security should be seriously considered despite the
harshness that a criminal remedy might bring. In other words, if the actions

178

See MO. ANN. STAT. § 105.270 (The criminal provision of subsection three arguably
applies only to subsection three, but it applies to “any of the provisions of this section”).
179
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 38.40.040 (2006).
180
See Government Careers: Getting a security clearance, WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2012),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-10-09/jobs/35501246_1_security-clearanceagencies-positions/5.
181
Criminal Records and Employment, NATIONAL LAW EMPLOYMENT PROJECT (Oct. 2,
2013), http://www.nelp.org/site/issues/category/criminal_records_and_employment/.
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of the federal employer (violating USERRA when he or she chooses to fire
a returning service member) hinder the military readiness by discouraging
citizens from volunteering in the armed services, then the harsh proposition
made here should be viewed in a favorable context.
The implications of being labeled a criminal for willfully violating
USERRA would extend beyond just the label of a “misdemeanor.” A
defendant may also experience other repercussions that are considered to be
collateral consequences, such as the loss of a professional license, which is
most likely the employer’s main source of livelihood.182 For instance, a
federal government attorney that violates USERRA by firing a service
member may have his or her bar license revoked because of a criminal
charge. As of December 2001, there were approximately 64 million—30
percent of the nation’s adult population—people in the United States with a
criminal record.183 In most jurisdictions, being charged with a crime can
trigger such collateral implications.
Being subject to collateral consequences has been called a form of “civil
death.”184 Civil death refers to the notion that “a person convicted of a
crime, whether misdemeanor or felony, may be subject to
disenfranchisement (or deportation if a noncitizen), criminal registration
and community notification requirements, and the ineligibility to live, work,
or be present in a particular location.”185 Some are not allowed to live

182

Id.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE , EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS THAT ENCOURAGE THE
EMPLOYMENT OF QUALIFIED PEOPLE CRIMINAL HISTORIES 1 (Oct. 2005), available at
http://www.justice.gov/olp/pdf/employmentstdssumary.pdf; see also U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL HISTORY INFORMATION SYSTEMS, 2001: A
CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION POLICY REPORT (Aug. 2003), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/sschis01.pdf.
184
Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass
Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1790 (2012).
185
Id.
183
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outside of civil confinement at all. In addition, the person may be subject to
occupational debarment.
The collateral consequences of a criminal conviction are not the same as
the social consequences of a conviction. Social consequences include loss
of a job and social stigma. These social side effects of criminal charges
(whether or not they lead to convictions) are mainly because arrests and
legal proceedings in the United States are public, and any federal
government agency under the microscope for a USERRA violation may
break due to political pressure from the various branches being exerted at an
ever increasing speed in light of social media.
C. Make Employee-Employer Contracts That Bind Employees into
Arbitration Unenforceable for USERRA Disputes
In order to fully exercise the protections provided by USERRA, the
federal government should not be able to contract out of USERRA. The
existing law states the following:
This chapter supersedes any State law (including any local law or
ordinance), contract, agreement, policy, plan, practice, or other
matter that reduces, limits, or eliminates in any manner any right or
benefit provided by this chapter, including the establishment of
additional prerequisites to the exercise of such right or the receipt
of any such benefit.186
Despite the plain language of the statutory language set out above, the Fifth
and the Sixth Circuits have decided recent cases by telling another story. In
both circuits, courts have held that USERRA does not override employeeemployer agreements that are crafted to bind employees to submit future
USERRA disputes about USERRA rights to binding arbitration, in lieu of
filing suit or filing a formal complaint with DOL-VETS.187 There needs to
186
187

38 U.S.C. 4302(b).
See Garrett v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 449 F.3d 672 (5th Cir. 2006); Landis v.
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be language in USERRA that defeats such intentions that force employees
into binding arbitration agreements. A bill introduced to Congress in 2008
contained a proposed new section to USERRA that would deem employeeemployer contracts that are subject to binding arbitration unenforceable.188
Pinnacle Eye Care LLC, 537 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2008).
188
See Proposed new section: 4328 to USERRA, H.R. 7178, 110th Cong. (2008).
(a) Protection of Employee Rights- Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, any clause of any agreement between an employer and an employee that
requires arbitration of a dispute arising under this chapter shall not be
enforceable.
(b) Exceptions(1) WAIVER OR AGREEMENT AFTER DISPUTE
ARISES-Subsection
(a) shall not apply with respect to any
dispute if, after such dispute
arises, the parties involved
knowingly and voluntarily agree to
submit such dispute to
arbitration.
(2) COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTSSubsection (a) shall
not preclude the enforcement of any of the
rights or terms of a valid
collective bargaining agreement.
(c) Validity and Enforcement- Any issue as to whether this section applies to
an arbitration clause shall be determined by Federal law. Except as otherwise
provided in chapter 1 of title 9, the validity or enforceability of an agreement
to arbitrate referred to in subsection (a) or (b)(1) shall be determined by a
court, rather than the arbitrator, irrespective of whether the party resisting
arbitration challenges the agreement to arbitrate specifically or in conjunction
with other terms of the agreement.
(d) Application- This section shall apply with respect to all contracts and
agreements between an employer and an employee in force before, on, or after
the date of the enactment of this section.
(b) Clerical Amendment- The table of sections for such chapter is amended
by inserting after the item relating to section 4327 the following new item:
4328. Unenforceability of agreements to arbitrate disputes.
(c) Application- The provisions of section 4328 of title 38, United States Code,
as added by subsection (a), shall apply to(1) any failure to comply with a provision of or any violation of chapter 43 of
title 38, United States Code, that occurs before, on, or after the date of the
enactment of this Act; and
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USERRA’s legislative history makes it apparent that such agreements
should not be enforced. For instance, section 4302(b) in essence preempts
any laws regulating employment agreements that provide fewer rights.189 It
was the committee’s intent that, even if a person protected under USERRA
intentionally or unintentionally signs a mandatory arbitration agreement,
any such arbitration decision shall not be binding as a matter of law.190
Moreover, a waiver of future statutory rights, such as a binding arbitration
agreement that an employer may seek as a condition of employment, may
never be enforced because it goes against the public policy concerns of
USERRA. The waiver of such a statutory right must already exist in order
for such a right to be waived.191

IV. CONCLUSION
The federal government must continue to improve outreach to the
uniformed services, veteran, Guard, and Reserve communities;
improve agencies’ USERRA training and guidance; and ensure
that service members and veterans in federal employment receive
the full extent of their employment protections, including
USERRA protections.192
Despite USERRA declaring the federal government as the “model
employer,” federal employers remain the top violators of USERRA, making
it extremely difficult for returning service members to obtain and keep jobs.
There is a widespread problem of the federal government penalizing and
denying jobs to reserve and active-duty military members. In the fiscal year
(2) to all actions or complaints filed under such chapter 43 that are pending on
or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
Id.
189

Peel v. Florida Dep’t of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979); Cronin v. Police
Dep’t of the City of New York, 675 F. Supp. 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
190
See Kidder v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 1060, 1064–65 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
191
See Leonard v. United Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 155, 159 (7th Cir. 1992).
192
Presidential Memo, supra note 23.
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2011, over 18 percent of the 1,548 complaints of USERRA violations
involved federal agencies.193 Although President Obama’s administration
has made it a priority to decrease veterans’ unemployment rates, advocates
for veterans claim that the process of challenging alleged USERRA
violations by the federal government are extremely difficult for service
members. The federal government has little incentive to fix this problem
because it faces no extreme penalties for USERRA violations other than
being ordered to pay lost wages and benefits.194 This differs tremendously
from the private and state employers who risk being ordered to pay double
lost wages to the service member.195
To effectively address this issue, I have proposed three incentives that
should compel, or at least inch federal employers closer to, such
compliance. First, there needs to be an economic incentive that would
require federal employers to pay more than just back wages to a service
member. Second, a “criminal” remedy that threatens criminal charges for
willful violators should be codified within the text of USERRA in order to
compel adherence and effectively address a USERRA claim. Finally,
binding arbitration via employee-employer agreements should be
considered unenforceable because they go against the legislative history of
USERRA. It is my hypothesis that these three proposals would truly bolster
the effectiveness of USERRA.
If the federal government can implement some sort of “double damage”
remedy similar to Wyoming’s MSRA, then it would likely incentivize the
federal government to comply with USERRA, especially since government
agencies are working with an ever decreasing budget, and the need to be
cost-efficient should compel compliance in light of threatening government
shutdowns and debt ceiling debates that call into question the economic
193

USERRA Report, supra note 22, at 8.
See 38 U.S.C. § 4324 (2010).
195
Id. § 4323(d).
194
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vitality of the United States. Moreover, a mandate requiring that the
employer pay the aggrieved service member’s attorney’s fees and litigation
costs would further encourage federal government compliance. USERRA’s
ineffectiveness to mandate a mandatory award of attorney’s fees and
litigation costs by leaving such a decision to the discretion of the MSPB
proves quite insensitive to the needs of a returning service member.196 At
this point in the adversarial process, the service member would have gone
through several channels before even reaching the MSPB, and would have
expended a great deal of financial resources to do so.197 Therefore, where
Wyoming’s MSRA makes it mandatory to award attorney’s fees and other
litigation costs associated with the claim, such as expert witnesses and
special tests, USERRA should follow suit.198
The risk of a criminal conviction should also be compelling to a federal
employer that deals with USERRA claims. Both Missouri and Washington
implements a provision directed at state and private employers that allows
for criminal charges to be pursued in connection with civil damages.199 The
Washington approach would offer a willful knowledge element to the
analysis to eradicate the fear of being too harsh on any one federal
employer. In other words, employers that willfully violate USERRA may
face criminal charges at the discretion of the court as outlined above.
The policies of maintaining a trained and ready national military force,
maintaining national security, and encouraging individuals to volunteer for
reserve duty justify the harsh “criminal” remedy in cases where the
196
See 38 U.S.C. § 4324(c)(4) (the MSPB has discretion to either award attorney’s fees
and other litigation costs or not).
197
The service member would have had gone through ESGR, DOL VETS, OSC, and then
finally the MSPB. See supra note? Part II.B.1-2.
198
See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 19-11-123 for the statutory language regarding mandatory
award of attorney’s fees.
199
See MO. ANN. STAT. § 105.270 (1984) (The criminal provision of subsection three
arguably applies only to subsection three, but it applies to “any of the provisions of this
section”); See also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 38.40.040 (2006).
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employer indirectly hinders national military readiness. This focus on
national security concerns embodies the Missouri law that seems to weigh
national security much more heavily than the appearance of extreme
corrective behavior by labeling an employer a criminal. Thus, implementing
a similar provision into USERRA that speaks to the policy goals of
maintaining national military readiness through encouraging individuals to
serve in the military will force federal employers to comply out of fear of
being stigmatized with a criminal label and possibly suffer collateral
consequences such as losing a professional license.
Finally, it was the Committee’s intent that, even if a person protected
under USERRA intentionally or unintentionally signs a mandatory
arbitration agreement, any such arbitration decision shall not be binding as a
matter of law.200 Moreover, a waiver of future statutory rights, such as a
binding arbitration agreement that an employer may seek as a condition of
employment, may never be enforced because it goes against the public
policy concerns of USERRA. In other words, the waiver of such a statutory
right must already exist in order for such a right to be waived.201
It is imperative that if the federal government seeks to be the “model
employer” when it comes to USERRA claims, it needs to create incentives
to ensure compliance behind closed doors. The three incentives that I have
proposed provide a path towards increased federal government adherence to
USERRA and should be considered in future legislation that seeks to bolster
USERRA enforcement in the federal government sector and mirror the
vision set by the current administration:
The Administration strongly believes that every man or woman
who has served in our country’s uniformed services deserves the
full protection of our employment laws, including USERRA. No
discrimination or unfair treatment based on one’s service will be
200
201

See Kidder v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 1060, 1064-65 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
See Leonard v. United Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 155, 159 (7th Cir. 1992).
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The Uniformed Services and Employment and Reemployment Rights Act

tolerated. We must do our utmost to ensure that all service
members’ employment and reemployment rights are respected.202

202

Presidential Memo, supra note 23.
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